Treasury Market Resilience: Key Developments and Future Outlook
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Treasury Market Resilience: Key Developments and Future Outlook

The Treasury market is the deepest and most liquid market in the world. However, some episodes of loss of liquidity or deterioration in the functioning of this market led to the formation of the Inter-Agency
Working Group for Treasury Market Surveillance (IAWG) in 2021. This group consists of staff from the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).

This group issued its first report in November 2021; since then, it has issued yearly progress reports. The latest progress report was issued on September 20th, 2024. I think this group has made significant progress in the last four years to improve the functioning of the treasury market. I wanted to provide some background and summarise the latest report in this post.

Rising Price of Market Liquidity During Stress:

Generally, when a treasury bond is issued, it trades frequently or is more liquid for 3 to 4 months, referred to as an on-the-run security. After the initial few months, bonds generally go off the run, i.e., they are thinly traded as portfolio managers tend to hold them in their portfolios for the long term rather than trade them. This concept is also true for other fixed-income securities. The off-the-run bonds are hard to value due to a lack of liquidity or price discovery and have higher bid-ask spreads even during regular times. These spreads can widen during the stress periods and can lead to funding stress as the firm selling these bonds needs to pay higher haircuts to convert them into cash at the time if needed.

The above figure is from the 2021 Inter-Agency Working Group for Treasury Market Surveillance (IAWG) Report. We can see that bid-ask spreads for on-the-run treasuries widened during the COVID crisis in March 2020; however, the widening was much higher for off-the-run treasuries. The demand for cash-like instruments shoots up during stress, and market participants try to sell primarily less liquid off-the-run securities for cash. However, if the spread widens, it further creates panic, which can spiral into other areas of the financial markets and create more significant crises.

Some of the notable challenges to the supply of liquidity in such events per IAWG were:

  1. Lack of participation from principal trading firms due to increased risk of market making during stress
  2. Limited dealer activity due to internal balance sheet constraints
  3. There are differences across markets in the use of circuit breakers. Circuit breakers were frequently activated in the futures market, but the cash treasury markets do not have circuit breakers and continue to operate without price discovery from futures.
  4. Scarcity of treasury bills due to soaring demand in stress
  5. Increased margin requirements by the CCPs and trading firms to manage risk during the volatile market environment

Since the disruption of March 2020 for the above-listed reasons, the IAWG has made significant progress in solving these issues. US Treasuries are considered one of the safest fixed-income securities in the world, and it is paramount that these types of disruptions do not repeat often and that the trust in owning treasuries is protected. Considering the size of this market, private markets can not solve the issues on their own, and solutions from the FRB and other agencies are a must. Below, I summarize all the five key steps IAWG took to make the treasury market more resilient. The buy-back program for off-the-run treasuries and plans of enhanced central clearing are the most critical steps, in my opinion.

Five IAWG Workstreams:

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  1. Improving the resilience of market intermediation:
    • Treasury buyback program: This is a critical program. It was launched in May 2024 with two objectives: bolstering secondary market liquidity and enhancing treasuries’ cash management capabilities. Currently, buybacks are smaller, but the treasury expects to improve liquidity over time via three channels. First, dealers will feel more confident in the market making of off-the-run securities as they will have Treasury as a regular and predictable buyer. Second, the buyback will be a focal point for trading, increasing market liquidity during buyback events. Third, dealers may be able to free up balance sheets using buybacks and use this capacity for additional market making.
    • SEC dealer registration requirement: In Feb 2024, the SEC adopted new rules requiring market participants who provide significant liquidity in the treasury market to register with the SEC and comply with federal securities laws and regulations. This is expected to improve market stability and resiliency and promote responsible behavior.
    • Analysis of off-the-run market structure and liquidity: IAWG staff studied Treasury transaction data and conducted market outreach to assess trading activity and liquidity in the off-the-run market. Their findings will be published in a working paper.
  2. Improving data quality and availability: to promote public confidence, the official sector is working to improve the quality and coverage of data.
    • End-of-day dissemination of on-the-run transactions: On March 25, 2024, FINRA began releasing end-of-day transaction data for on-the-run nominal coupon Treasury securities, including capped trade sizes and critical transaction details, with historical data starting April 1, 2024.
    • Non-centrally cleared bilateral repo transaction reporting: In May 2024, OFR finalized a rule requiring daily reporting of non-centrally cleared bilateral repo (NCCBR) transactions. This will fill a crucial data gap in the U.S. repo market and enhance oversight of financial stability risks starting in December 2024.
    • Updates to the Weekly Report of Dealer Financing and Fails (FR 2004C): In July 2024, the Federal Reserve Board updated its Weekly Report of Dealer Financing and Fails (FR 2004C) to separately list sponsored general collateral repo transactions, enhancing data on centrally cleared repo markets alongside other existing reports.
    • Form PF improvements finalized: In February 2024, the SEC and CFTC adopted changes to Form PF to enhance systemic risk monitoring and improve oversight of private fund advisers, with new reporting requirements for hedge funds and improved data on Treasury securities, effective in March 2025.
  3. Evaluating expanded central clearing:
    • Adoption of SEC rules related to clearing Treasury securities transactions: In December 2023, the SEC adopted rules to improve risk management for central counterparties and expand central clearing of Treasury securities. These rules aim to reduce various market risks and enhance efficiency, with over $4 trillion in additional daily activity expected to be centrally cleared.
  4. Enhanced trading venue transparency and oversight: The SEC is reviewing proposed amendments to expand Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs) oversight and redefine “exchange” to include platforms for U.S. government securities and decentralized trading systems, focusing on improving market efficiency and resilience. FICC is the only central counterparty (CCA) covered under the Treasury clearing rules. However, other clearing organizations have shown interest in offering central clearing services, and SEC staff is engaging with them.
  5. Examining effects of leverage and fund liquidity risk management practices:
    • FSOC Hedge Fund Working Group: The FSOC Hedge Fund Working Group (HFWG) has refined its risk monitoring framework to assess hedge fund activities and their potential threats to financial stability. The framework focuses on risks like large asset liquidations, transmission of risks to interconnected institutions, and reductions in financial intermediation. The group has closely monitored hedge fund leverage and borrowing trends, especially in the U.S. Treasury cash-futures basis trade. It analyzes vulnerabilities in repo transactions with low or zero haircuts.
    • Treasury Market Practices Group: The TMPG, sponsored by the FRBNY, enhances the integrity and efficiency of Treasury, agency debt, and mortgage-backed securities markets by developing best practice recommendations. Over the past year, it has focused on liquidity risk management, studied risk management in the NCCBR market, and addressed issues related to the SEC’s central clearing rule while reviewing practices around cyber risks and price transparency in trading.

Conclusion:

The effective functioning of the US Treasury market is essential for global financial stability. Events like March 2020 or the recent episode in September 2024 (even though this one was far smaller in magnitude) can lead to significant damage. The US treasuries are critical to bank liquidity management, and most banks hold them in their liquidity buffer. USTs are classified as Level 1 High-Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) in the US LCR rule, i.e., they qualify as one of the most liquid collateral with 0% haircut. However, events such as March 2020 raised concerns that firms may be unable to monetize these securities (especially off the run) USTs for cash without significant haircuts. The efforts in the last four years from IAWG effectively try to address these issues. I am confident that if agencies successfully push these changes, the functioning of the US treasury market will improve significantly. As an asset class, USTs will be perceived as cash-alike.

If you listened to recent speeches from FRB Vice Chair Barr, you would have heard him mention multiple times that the FRB is trying to change liquidity regulation to make holding reserves and holding treasuries almost substitutable. This can improve banks’ stress testing and money market functioning. Soon, the IAWG efforts and changes in liquidity regulation should lead to a much more efficient US treasury market.

One important thing to note is that US treasuries, with one of the most liquid and deep markets, require such efforts to fix (mainly for off-the-runs); how inefficient can the markets for other fixed-income off-the-run securities get during stress? Banks relying on any other type of fixed-income collateral to serve as HQLA during stress need to be aware of these risks. For example, SVB held most of its liquidity buffer in off-the-run mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie/Freddie Mae (these securities do not have a US Government guarantee). If less liquid US Treasuries can face spread widening during stress, less quality collateral faces worse predicaments. In short, US treasuries are the only true HQLAs (other than cash), and the IAWG efforts and upcoming regulatory changes will remove any remaining concerns. This is why I believe JP Morgan only holds USTs in its US LCR HQLA population based on its US LCR public disclosures—the only major bank, per my observation, to do so.

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Disclosure

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